Freezmo: self-hosted notes-to-activities study app
Next.js 15 app that turns photos, PDFs, DOCX/PPTX and text into a swipeable feed of AI-generated activities (flashcards, multiple choice, true/false, fill-in-the-blank, matching, ordering, short answer) using the user's own Ollama models. Highlights: - All AI calls run in server route handlers; the browser never talks to Ollama. - Bring-your-own-key mode (default): the key lives only in the browser and is sent per-request; server, local-daemon and shared-key modes also supported. - Client-side document extraction (pdf.js, mammoth, jszip) with scanned-PDF page rendering for the vision model; notes stay in their original language. - ChatGPT-style shell: collapsible sidebar / mobile drawer, neutral token-based light + dark themes, folder organisation, PWA (manifest, SW, offline page). - Strict JSON validation with zod + auto-repair, rate limiting, and request guards (cross-origin, body-size, API-key sanitising). - setup.sh bootstraps deps, .env.local and a production build. Gitignore excludes .env*, the generated pdf.js worker and local scratch files.
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lib/http-guard.ts
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lib/http-guard.ts
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/**
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* Small server-side guards shared by the API routes.
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*
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* Freezmo is a self-hosted app with no accounts, so the realistic threats are
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* (a) a hostile page in the user's browser poking the local server, (b) huge
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* bodies exhausting memory, and (c) odd values ending up in outbound headers.
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*/
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function formatBytes(bytes: number): string {
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if (bytes < 1024 * 1024) return `${Math.max(1, Math.round(bytes / 1024))} KB`;
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return `${(bytes / 1024 / 1024).toFixed(bytes < 10 * 1024 * 1024 ? 1 : 0)} MB`;
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}
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/** Rejects requests whose body is larger than `maxBytes` (Content-Length check). */
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export function rejectOversizedBody(request: Request, maxBytes: number): Response | null {
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const header = request.headers.get("content-length");
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if (!header) return null;
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const length = Number.parseInt(header, 10);
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if (Number.isFinite(length) && length > maxBytes) {
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return Response.json(
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{
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error: `Request body is too large (${formatBytes(length)}). Limit is ${formatBytes(maxBytes)}.`,
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kind: "too_large",
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},
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{ status: 413 },
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);
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}
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return null;
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}
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/**
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* Same-origin check for state-changing requests.
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*
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* There is no cookie-based auth here, so CSRF can't steal a session — but a
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* malicious website could still make the user's browser fire requests at a
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* LAN-hosted Freezmo (and burn their rate limit or, in `server` auth mode,
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* their credits). Browsers always send `Origin` on cross-origin POSTs and
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* cannot forge it, so a mismatch is a reliable signal. Requests without an
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* `Origin` (curl, scripts, native apps) are allowed.
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*/
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export function rejectCrossOrigin(request: Request): Response | null {
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const origin = request.headers.get("origin");
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if (!origin) return null;
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let originHost: string;
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try {
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originHost = new URL(origin).host;
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} catch {
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return Response.json({ error: "Invalid Origin header.", kind: "forbidden" }, { status: 403 });
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}
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const host = request.headers.get("host");
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if (host && originHost === host) return null;
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// Next dev/prod behind a proxy may rewrite Host; trust x-forwarded-host too.
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const forwardedHost = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-host");
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if (forwardedHost && originHost === forwardedHost) return null;
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// Allow the loopback pair (localhost vs 127.0.0.1) for convenience.
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const loopback = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]", "0.0.0.0"]);
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const bare = (value: string) => value.replace(/:\d+$/, "");
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if (loopback.has(bare(originHost)) && loopback.has(bare(host ?? ""))) return null;
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return Response.json(
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{ error: "Cross-origin requests are not allowed.", kind: "forbidden" },
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{ status: 403 },
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);
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}
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/**
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* API keys are pasted by humans, so clean them before they go into a header:
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* trim, drop control characters/whitespace (header injection), cap the length.
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*/
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export function sanitiseApiKey(value: string | null | undefined): string {
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if (!value) return "";
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return value
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.replace(/[\u0000-\u001F\u007F-\u009F\s]/g, "")
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.slice(0, 512);
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}
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